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Is economics scientific discipline loyal to its own starting points and
fundamental principles?
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The article argues that the economic scientific community, by disregarding the impor-
tance of freedom which was essential for its emancipation and market as its key cri-
terion of choice, is disloyal to its own starting points and fundamental principles. By
dictating strict methodological rules the neoclassical school has consolidated its
monopoly position within economics. The article highlights that this methodological
normativism is substantially reducing the diversity of methodological approaches and
that such restriction of freedom has become a source of subordination within eco-
nomic community. The author argues that today a new emancipation is needed, with
a strong emphasis on the freedom to forge new approaches and acute awareness of
the fact that no theoretical platform can persist without adequate demand for its find-
ings in the science market.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory boasts a rich and often controversial history of theoretical orientations.
In addition to periods of strong consent and unity, there are also periods in the history
of economic thought when the flow of ideas was not as consistent. Four major eras in
the history of economic science clearly outline an evolution from pluralism to the
monism of the neoclassical paradigm. Before 1750 when economics had not yet been
established as an independent scientific discipline, individual views were predominant.
The second major period was that of the classical political economy (1750–1870) in
which economics strongly favoured internal pluralism. Due to ever more frequent
disagreements in theory, the economists turned to methodology in search of a solution
to the problems they were addressing. A third period came about in 1871 with the
breakthrough of the marginalism by using mathematical methods that allowed logical
analysis. The fourth period saw Marshall’s microeconomics and Keynes’ macroeco-
nomic ideas being forged together in the middle of the twentieth century by Samuelson
to form the neoclassical synthesis. The neoclassical school has developed a methodolog-
ical apparatus with strong emphasis on mathematical and statistical methods in order to
specify standards against which achievements in economics are evaluated.
The drive for more freedom in the early periods of evolution and emancipation of
economic discipline is actually re-emerging today as economic orthodoxy has been
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criticised from all sides for its monopoly position within the economic scientific
community leading to the inability to face new challenges. The main contribution of this
article is to show that a new emancipation is needed in economics today, with a strong
emphasis on the freedom to forge new approaches and on the science market that can
reveal which approaches have competitive advantages over others. These two elements
(freedom and science market) have not yet been addressed simultaneously in the litera-
ture so far. Kristensen (2001), McCloskey (1983) and Velupillai (2011) argue that neo-
classical dominance deprived the scientists of their freedom of thought. Other authors
pointed out that science market enables selection of the best approach (Caldwell, 1984;
Calas & Smircich, 1999; Mearman, Wakeley, Shoib, & Webber, 2009).
Our primary goal is to understand the relation between freedom and science market
simultaneously and more profoundly in order to show that economic community, by dis-
regarding them, is disloyal to its own starting points and fundamental principles. I shall
argue that, as a result of the restrictions on the freedom, methodological normativism of
the neoclassical school has become a source of subordination within economic commu-
nity. I seek to point out the importance of freedom to forge new approaches and that the
most appropriate approach should be chosen through the struggle between competing
theories for customers in the science market. To my knowledge, such analysis has not
been conducted so far.
The article is structured as follows. In section two, the methodological normativism
of the neoclassical school is presented. In section three, I point out the importance of
freedom in forging new methodological approaches in economics (methodological plu-
ralism). The aim of section four is to stress the importance of the science market in the
economic community. The last section concludes by summarising the main findings.
2. Methodological normativism of the neoclassical paradigm
The domination of the neoclassical paradigm is often addressed in the economic scien-
tific community (Dow, 2008; Goodwin, 2008; Johnson, 1983). ‘Paradigm’ is understood
as a conceptual and methodological core that is common to all members of a particular
scientific community. It involves a set of generally adopted scientific achievements
which a scientist can employ to resolve the problems in a certain way without having to
clarify the basic assumptions (Kuhn, 1998).
The unity of introductory textbooks, academic programmes and articles in reputable
professional academic journals illustrate the high level of domination of the neoclassical
school within economics. Its reputation is further elevated by the increasing influence
that the proponents of this school have on the adoption of key policy decisions.
Domination of the neoclassical economics is also illustrated by its high level of
self-sufficiency, its expansion to new fields (McKinley & Mone, 1994; Stigler, 1983),
and the lack of willingness for better cooperation with others scientific disciplines
(Burell & Morgan, 1979; Hassard, 1993). The neoclassical school consolidated its
monopoly position within economics mainly by dictating the methodological rules.
Neoclassical methodological normativism is a combination of logical positivism,
deductive method, instrumentalism, and operationalism. Due to the need for objectifica-
tion of knowledge the economy found itself in the grip of scientific deductivism, deriving
from economic axioms (e.g. rationality) logical conclusions. The main goal of instrumen-
talists is to submit hypotheses and the central test of their validity is the comparison
between a forecast and experience (Friedman, 1984). Samuelson’s operationalism puts
forward the algebraic sign for each parameter otherwise it can be subject to constant
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rejection. With its extensive use of mathematics, in order to maintain consistency, the
neoclassical school has adopted the methodology of natural sciences (Blaug, 1992;
Caldwell, 1984; McCloskey, 1994). It seems that mathematics, a discipline that repre-
sents the apex of scientific purity, has become ‘the lingua franca’ of modern economics.
Backhouse (2010) argues that economics is, comparing to other social sciences, less
pluralistic in relation to methods. Similarly, Dow (2008) argues that pluralism in eco-
nomics is mainly understood at the level of theory and not method. McCloskey (1983)
and Phelps (1990) maintain that most economists accept the same methodology regard-
less of whether they may belong to the mainstream camp within the neoclassical school
or whether they are their main opponents (heterodox school). As early as the 1930s,
Lange (1936) presented in the debate on socialist calculation paradoxically the proof, by
employing the neoclassical methodological arsenal, that an economy based on central
planning was at least as efficient as a capitalist one. Thus it may be viewed as paradox
that the ideas of the neoclassical school, unacceptable to many in terms of contents,
were acceptable from the aspect of methodology. Obviously the neoclassical methodo-
logical approach is an ideal for the majority of contemporary economists.
However, many authors point out deficiencies of such an approach. Caldwell (1984)
contends that no methodology, including neoclassical, should monopolise the field of
science, since universal methodology is not only unnecessary it is counterproductive.
Ward (1972) argues that neoclassical paradigm destroys scientific dialogue and that
application of mathematics promotes exclusively non-radical economists.
Summing up the findings of these authors, it could be maintained that neoclassical
methodological normativism is substantially reducing the diversity of methodological
approaches within economics. The neoclassical school has consolidated its monopoly
position mainly by strict methodological rules, paying little attention to alternative meth-
odological approaches. I believe that the key reason lies in its lack of the understanding
of freedom, which could lead to alternative methodological approaches.
3. Subordination, freedom and the pledge for methodological pluralism in
economics
Any claim regarding truth was in the domain of the Church in the Middle Ages;
knowledge and faith were intertwined, and theology was the queen of all disciplines.
More freedom allowed deviation from the Church (Mill, 1956) and the emancipation
of many sciences, including economics (Rich, 1981). However, in its subsequent devel-
opment, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, economic theory seeking
greater unity simply abandoned the understanding of the importance of freedom. By
employing mathematical formalism, economics has ruled out any possibility of exceed-
ingly free formation of methodological approaches. Thus, I strongly believe that a
mutual exclusiveness between freedom and neoclassical paradigm exists, since freedom
of thought and research is always embedded in a certain social structure (scientific
community).
Many authors (in)directly stress the deficiency of the neoclassical methodological
monism from the aspect of freedom, by leading economists into intellectual slavery
(Eichner, 1983; Kristensen, 2001), intellectual imbecility (McCloskey, 1983), by imposi-
tion of correct thinking on potential dissenters of the mind (Velupillai, 2011), by reduc-
ing creative thinking (Dutt, 2011), and by requirements to publish mainly in top
journals (Frey, 2009). Commitment and silent consensus in the economic scientific com-
munity, regarding the prevailing methodology, obviously preclude freedom.
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However, many economists facing the urge to be published adopt the neoclassical
methodology, because this makes it easier for them to have their work published. The
environment determines their approach by controlling the top graduate schools, journals,
and research institutions. Scientists in turn often provide feedback through their findings
to further consolidate the position of the neoclassical paradigm and to reproduce its rigid
structure. All this leads to ideological conduct of academia economists who defend a
particular theory longer than necessary and reasonable. Thus, exclusive membership in
the neoclassical community translates into inability to express dissent, and into a lack of
self-reflection. Such restriction of freedom in the economic scientific community is akin
to the political despotism in a totalitarian society.
I believe that the importance of freedom in forming more pluralistic methodological
approaches in economics should be particularly emphasised, as only freedom can enable
a departure from the methodological normativism of the neoclassical school. As wit-
nessed by the history of science, major leaps were only made when certain methodolog-
ical rules were abandoned. Freedom encourages new scientific approaches, since the
understanding of cognitive processes fundamentally depends on the freedom of thought.
Freedom to form one’s own (methodological) approaches is at the very heart of the
theory of science. Eichner (1983) argues that neoclassical theory rejects any epistemo-
logical questions because this could seriously threaten its monopoly position. At the
epistemological level, Feyerabend’s methodological pluralism (1999) allows the highest
degree of freedom. Several economists have been discussing the role of pluralism in
economics (Dow, 1990, 2008; Dutt, 2011; Fernández and Pessali, 2001; Freeman, 2010;
Hodgson, 1992). The aim of pluralism is to ensure that each of the various possible
methodologies is consistent by its own criteria, and to promote mutual understanding
among practitioners of different methodologies. The postmodern slogan ‘anything goes’
would undoubtedly promote new methodological approaches in economics. However,
no approach would be privileged nor a priori eliminated since superiority cannot be
claimed, otherwise we would fall into the same kind of methodological monism. An
economist could use approaches that would, in his own belief, be best suited for a par-
ticular problem and situation. Also the decision-makers will have a range of different
policy scenarios at their disposal.
Opportunity cost of methodological pluralism within economics includes less atten-
tion on previously accumulated knowledge and less conceptuality. Portes (2008) argues
that pluralism means relaxation of professional standards. Garnett (2008) argues that
until heterodox economists, pledging for plurality in theories and methods in economics,
unite behind a single general theory without logical inconsistencies that they are going
to be losers. Dutt (2011) points out that reasons which drive economics away from
pluralism, including the power of vested interest groups and the career interests of
economists, may lead to misplaced scientism.
It is impossible to have all the answers and one universal solution as the neoclassi-
cal school claims and offers; however, this also does not require a poorly defined plural-
ism. This means we are between the Scylla of relativism and Charybdis of objectivism;
between saying everything and saying nothing, and between tolerance and falsehood
(Hodgson, 2001; King, 2005). Since postmodern pluralism may lead to intellectual nihil-
ism, the methodological pluralism needs to be limited (to a finite number of approaches)
in order not to give the researchers the right to assume whatever they feel happy with.
The economic orthodoxy has been also accused of social irrelevance from all sides.
Blaug (1992) asserts that neoclassical economics has relatively weak forecasting power
since it has failed most conspicuously when attempting to provide practical advice.
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Goodwin (2008) and Leontief (1971) argue that the neoclassical school has neglected
the consistency between theory and reality. Mayhew (2008) points out that orthodox
economics is inadequate to account for the lives of the vast majority of people. Since
2007 the financial and global economic crisis has significantly intensified controversy
about the status of mainstream economics (Blinder, 2010; Gunn, 2011; Helbing and
Balietti, 2010; Kowalski and Shachmurove, 2011).
These authors, and many others, point out the misunderstanding of the real problems
by the neoclassical theory. Obviously there is a trade-off between the benefits (theoreti-
cal rigour, internal consistency) of the neoclassical economics and the costs which
appear in the form of failure to comprehend the real problems. I believe that reality has
a strong influence on science especially when a growing divergence between economic
reality and theory can no longer be denied. The methodological approach that is based
exclusively on mathematical tools and statistical methods is no longer adequate for a
deeper understanding of today’s problems. I believe that the urge for a deeper
understanding of today’s crisis makes a new methodological leap absolutely essential.
The drive for more freedom in the early periods of evolution and emancipation of
economic discipline actually only re-emerged today when economics is facing new chal-
lenges. Academic freedom has a real meaning only in the context of serving the society
to better understand the reality. I believe that today, a new emancipation is needed, this
time inwards, with stronger emphasis on the freedom to forge new methodological
approaches in economics. Pluralism will enable the economist to think more creatively
in order to more efficiently solve the problems by pushing forward the frontiers of
knowledge without falling back to neoclassical normativism. Methodological pluralism
would allow free formation of approaches; however, the problem of choice of the most
appropriate theoretical approach still remains open.
4. The role of the science market in economics
Consent today within economics is based today on a political process of power by
rendering individual schools to be subordinated to stronger currents. The neoclassical
school has due to its methodological normativism zero tolerance to opposing views
(Dutt, 2011). However, I strongly believe that a more democratic and pluralistic debate
within the economic scientific discipline would undoubtedly contribute significantly to a
better understanding of the real economy. The principles of political subordination
within economic scientific community should be rejected in order to allow more
competition between alternative ideas. Thus, the science market mechanism should be
considered as an alternative ‘mechanism’ within the economic scientific community.
Instead of subordination due to methodological normativism we pledge for a market-
based exchange and competition of ideas.
It is a paradox that neoclassical economic theory with a strong emphasis on the
importance of the market mechanism, as the most important system of resource alloca-
tion, has failed to consider such a mechanism in the market of ideas. Especially for
economists, it would make sense to use the science market as the key criterion of
choice.
On the supply side we are dealing with different schools of thought in economics.
Kuhn’s concept of paradigms can be closely connected to different schools of thought
(Dow, 2008). Assuming there are, in addition to the neoclassical paradigm, also other
paradigms (e.g. Austrian, post-Keynesian, Marxist, Institutional), then the question of
comparison between these arises. Kuhn (1998) believes that one paradigm cannot be the
50 K. Aleksandar
basis for evaluation of another, because there is no neutral theoretical field for their
comparison. Paradigms are incommensurable because they rely on different assump-
tions; thus, they are in a ‘state of war’ (Reed, 1994).
With incommensurability, there is no absolute set of appraisal criteria by which to
judge the theories. It is simply impossible to establish whether neoclassical theory has
any advantage over the institutionalists, for example. The problem becomes even more
acute when we seek to compare the neoclassical paradigm to one that is dominant in
another scientific community. It is difficult to judge why a theoretical achievement of an
economist is any better than a scientific contribution of a sociologist. I believe that crite-
ria cannot be based on methodological normativism, rather, it should be sought in the
market competition between different approaches and the selection of the best one
among them.
However, the science market does not depend on the supply side only, where we are
dealing with different theoretical approaches. The demand side with different consumers
is equally important. I am convinced that no theoretical platform can persist in the long
run without adequate demand for its theoretical findings. In the narrowest sense,
economic knowledge is bounded to the academic sphere. At this level, academia econo-
mists are the predominant buyers of intellectual capital offered by particular economic
schools of thought. Academia economists invest their energy end time into those
theoretical fields where maximum return is expected, which is analogous to the
understanding of the capitalist market society.
In the broader sense, the buyers of intellectual capital offered by particular economic
schools of thought are the economists who are active at the level of enterprises (e.g.
managers, owners) and government (e.g. public servants, policy advisers). Their activi-
ties and decisions manifest the importance and significance of a particular new theory
as its theoretical assumptions are either corroborated or refuted. In the broadest sense
there are non-scientists (laypeople) with mostly non-theoretical experience. They are
interested in the common sense logic within everyday life. Each individual unknowingly
confirms or rejects the assumptions of a particular economic school through his routine
daily interpretations.
Market demand for intellectual products by different buyers clearly shows how
successful a particular theory is in resolving actual problems and needs of our time. No
theoretical offer, or supply, can be successful if it is unable to market its conclusions in
the professional and lay public. Economics ought to at least partially abandon its own
Say’s thesis that any supply of economic knowledge will generate its own demand. Eco-
nomic science should become a business in a society of knowledge, a market task outside
the monopolisation of theoretical cognition. Thus, the solution does not rest within the
methodological normativism, leading to exclusion of others, but in the struggle between
competing theories for customers and for legitimacy of a theory in the science market.
One economic school of thought has to refute a competing theory in order to be able
to assert its own through persuasion of potential buyers in the science market. The domi-
nant mechanisms are competition and struggle for domination between different theoreti-
cal approaches. Only a market for science as a mechanism of selection can be the
criterion of which economic theories have, in the spirit of Ricardo, a competitive edge
over the others. Economic science must therefore become a self-reflexive and self-critical
system with less intellectual inertness and inherent conservatism. It must begin to attract
research groups rather than to ex ante regulate them by specifying the progress of
research. Economic scientific community must become more loyal to the ideals of
intellectual competition in the science market.
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5. Conclusion
Within economics, the neoclassical paradigm has strongly monopolised the field. Use of
rigorous language expresses its desire for universal application of neoclassical methodo-
logical approaches in economics and even in traditionally non-economic fields. At the
break of the millennium, inadequacy and unfitness of the neoclassical school is mostly
manifest in the failure of economics to understand the importance of freedom and
science market.
By promoting positivism, the economic discipline strongly underestimated the
importance of freedom which was essential for its emancipation in the early periods of
the discipline’s evolution. I believe that the importance of freedom to forge new meth-
odological approaches in economics has actually re-emerged today as economics faces
new challenges. I strongly believe that a departure from the methodological normativism
of the neoclassical school, in order to foster more democratic and pluralistic debate
within the economic scientific discipline, would contribute significantly to a better
understanding of today’s problems.
However, methodological pluralism opens up the problem of choice of the most
appropriate approach. I believe that only the science market can reveal which
approaches have competitive advantages over others by selecting the best through
proliferation of mutually competitive theories. If particular economic theory is to
endure, it should allocate its efforts in a way that leaves it better suited to meet the
requirements of its users. In the narrow sense, these subscribers are members of the
economic scientific community; in broader terms, they are different economists active
in world of business and government; in the general sense, they are people with no
theoretical background, who through their routine interpretations unconsciously con-
firm or reject particular economic theories. The demand for intellectual products
offered by a particular economic school will undoubtedly show how successful each
theory is at responding to the challenges of the day. At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the key question is whether economic theory is capable to
respond efficiently to the new challenges regarding today’s crisis of the capitalistic
system.
Economic scientific community should consider the science market as the key crite-
rion of choice among different theoretical approaches. Freedom becomes a prerequisite
for the establishment of an efficient science market as it opens up the questions of alter-
native methodological approaches and the question of utility of theoretical ideas to the
particular user. The science market will pick those methodological approaches and theo-
retical views that are the most fitting from the aspect of resolving the actual problems
and needs of our time.
Methodological pluralism will lead to a demise of monopolisation and economic
imperialism of the neoclassical paradigm that was based on the drive for universal
dominance. The greater the freedom and competition in the economic science, the
greater the level of de-monopolisation of the neoclassical economic theory will be.
Despite this, or perhaps exactly because of greater understanding of the importance of
freedom in the science market, neoclassical economics has one more opportunity to
prove its intellectual power and superiority as primus inter pares; this time through a
competitive race and to a lesser extent through methodological normativism and
subordination within economic scientific community. Only then will economics
become loyal to its own starting points, as it embraces freedom and competition in
the very market for science.
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